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Property Law. Bielecki v. Boissel, 715 A.2d 571 (R.I. 1998). In
Bielecki v. Boissel,1 the Rhode Island Supreme Court resolved a
dispute concerning a jointly held bank account. 2 In doing so, the
court abandoned the rigid rule concerning jointly held bank accounts previously articulated in Robinson v. Delfino.
In Bielecki v. Boissel,3 the Court determined that a showing of
fraud, undue influence, or duress, as stated in Robinson, are but
one method of defeating a surviving joint holders claim to the proceeds of a jointly held bank account, the other being a showing that
4
the jointly held account was for convenience only.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

Christine Bielecki (Christine) and her husband, Dennis Bielecki (Dennis), were co-executors of Ernest Boissel's (Ernest) estate. 5 Shortly before Ernest's death, Lynne-Marie Boissel (Lynne),
Christine's sister and defendant in this case, withdrew funds from
several joint bank accounts which stood in both her name and that
of her father. 6 As co-executors of Ernest's estate, Christine and
Dennis filed suit against Lynne, asserting three counts under theories of recovery. 7 The first count alleged "unlawful detention" of
the funds.8 The second count was brought under the theory of constructive trust. 9 The third count asserted that Lynne had converted the funds of the jointly held accounts. 10 Even though the
complaint alleged three different counts under three seemingly different theories of recovery, the court noted that "[elach count alleges that Lynne 'falsely, fraudulently and with intent to deceive'
induced Ernest to create the several joint accounts by representing
to him that such were in his best interest" knowing these representations to be false. 1
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

715 A.2d 571 (R.I. 1998).
See Robinson v. Delfino, 710 A.2d 154 (R.I. 1998).
715 A.2d 571 (R.I. 1998).
Id. at 574-75.
See id. at 572.

6.

See id.

7.

See id.

8.
9.
10.
11.

See id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
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The following facts were deduced at trial. Ernest's health began to fail after the death of his wife in 1981.12 Shortly after his
wife's death, Ernest decided to open several joint bank accounts in
the name of himself and his daughter, Lynne.13 Ernest's reasoning
for creating these accounts was so Lynne could take care of him
during his lifetime. 14 It was Ernest's intent that, upon his death,
the funds remaining in the joint accounts would be divided among
his family members. 15 Ernest's will was introduced at trial as further proof of his intent.16 The will specifically provided that "those
names on the aforementioned accounts [including all jointly held
bank accounts] were placed on those accounts for convenience
only," and furthermore, that Ernest "did not intend to give those
accounts as a gift to any person other than" as bequeathed in his
will.

17

On December 22, 1993, Ernest slipped into a coma while in
Pawtucket Memorial Hospital.' 8 While Ernest was in a coma,
Lynne, with knowledge of the provisions of his will, closed the joint
accounts she held with her father and transferred the funds into
accounts bearing her name only. 19 Therefore, upon Ernest's death,
on March 22, 1993, the provision in his will declaring that all
money held in the joint bank accounts was for naught, since such
20
accounts no longer existed.
The trial justice, sitting without a jury, entered judgment in
favor of the plaintiff-coexecutors. 21 Lynne appealed to the Rhode
Island Supreme Court, alleging that the plaintiffs were not entitled to the relief granted by the trial justice due to the fact that
there was no finding of fraudulent conduct on her part. 2 2
12. See id. at 573.
13. See id. at 572.
14. See id. at 572-73. The purpose of these joint accounts were not in dispute.
Lynne testified at trial that Ernest, her father, "wanted me to take care of him,
and that there was one particular account that was for $2,000 and that he wanted
to use that for his funeral costs.., and that after I paid all the bills, to distribute
the funds to family members and to include Jason [Ernest's grandson]." Id. at 573.
15. See id. at 573.
16. See id.
17. Id.
18. See id. at 574.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See id.at 571.
22. See id.at 572. On appeal, defendant also asserted that the trial justice
erroneously ruled on her motion to dismiss made at the conclusion of plaintiffs
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ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

The Rhode Island Supreme Court, in an opinion written by
Justice Bourcier, determined that a finding of fraudulent conduct
was not necessary in order for the plaintiffs to recover. 23 Even
though plaintiffs' complaint asserted fraud and deceit by the defendant, the court held that under the Rhode Island Rules of Civil
Procedure, plaintiffs failure to amend their complaint to conform
with the evidence presented at trial was not fatal to the final
24
judgment.
Furthermore, the court found that the trial justice's decision
was based, not upon fraudulent conduct, but rather upon the nature of the jointly held bank accounts. 25 Since, according to the
court, the trial justice's decision rested upon his finding that "the
accounts in dispute were all in the first instance created as convenience accounts and not as true joint accounts with right of survi26
vorship," his decision was well-founded in law.
The court summarily determined that it's recent opinion in
Robinson v. Delfino27 was "inapplicable to this case." 28 The court
further noted that nothing in Robinson neither "suggests that joint
bank accounts established for purposes of convenience only are no
longer permitted," nor "proclaim[s] that any right of present ownership in the account funds is transferred in a joint bank account
29
to a person whose name is placed thereon for convenience only."
In Robinson, the court attempted to once and for all clarify the
law surrounding survivorship rights in jointly held bank accounts. 30 In order to effectuate this task, the court established a
case-in-chief. See id. The court noted that even though the trial justice employed

a rule of law "totally inapplicable" to the defendant's motion, his error was "harmless in light of the after-developed case facts." Id.
23. See id. at 574.
24. See id. The court noted that Rhode Island Superior Court Rule of Civil
Procedure 15(b) provides that "failure to so amend [the complaint] does not affect
the result of the trial of [those] issues." Id. at 574 n.4 (quoting R.I. Super. R. Civ.
P. 15(b)).
25. See id. at 574.
26. Id.
27. 710 A.2d 154 (R.I. 1998).
28. Bielecki, 715 A.2d at 574. Lynne first raised for consideration the recent
holding in Robinson v. Delfino at oral argument before the supreme court. See id.
29. Id.
30. Robinson, 710 A.2d at 156.
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rigid rule concerning such accounts. 3 1 The rigid rule established
by the court provided that "the opening of a joint bank account
wherein survivorship rights are specifically provided for is conclusive evidence of the intention to transfer to the survivor an immediate in praesentijoint beneficial possessory ownership right in the
balance of the account remaining" upon the death of the depositor.3 2 The sole restriction on this immediate ownership right is
that there must be an absence of fraud, undue influence, duress, or
lack of mental capacity. 3 3
In Bielecki, the trial justice's decision in favor of the plaintiffs
was not based upon fraud, undue influence, duress, or lack of
mental capacity. Instead, his decision was grounded upon the finding that the accounts were established as convenience accounts. 3 4
Since, according to the court, the trial justice's decision "was amply
supported by the evidence," the decision of that court, ordering
Lynne to return to the estate the funds removed from the jointly
held bank accounts, must be affirmed. 35
CONCLUSION

The court's decision in Bielecki once again adds confusion to
the law surrounding jointly held bank accounts as articulated just
three months earlier in Robinson v. Delfino. The court's goal in
Robinson was to conform the law surrounding jointly held accounts
to the public's common understanding. 3 6 Finding the public's common understanding to be that the establishment of joint bank accounts creates an immediate possessory interest in the survivor,
the court held that absent fraud, undue influence, duress, or lack of
mental capacity, the survivor receives an immediate ownership
right in the balance of the accounts. 3 7
In Bielecki, the court departs from the rigid rule established in
Robinson, specifically noting that a finding by the trial justice of
fraud was not actually necessary in order for a determination that
the sole survivor of a jointly held bank account was not entitled to
31. See id.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 160-61.
See id.
Bielecki, 715 A.2d at 574.
Id. at 575.
Robinson, 710 A.2d at 156.
See id. at 160-61.
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the proceeds of those accounts. 38 In finding as it did, the court
once again re-establishes the "account of convenience" exception,
thus weakening the rigid rule established in Robinson.
Christopher E. Friel

38. Bielecki, 715 A.2d at 574.
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Property Law. Curato v. Brain, 715 A.2d 631 (R.I. 1998). A
property settlement agreement under which a couple's minor
daughters were each to receive a one-fourth interest in a parcel of
property, entered into by a father and mother upon their divorce,
created a third-party beneficiary contract, not a trust. The daughters, as beneficiaries of the contract, had to assent to or ratify the
contract in order to enforce their rights in the contract. Because
the daughters had no knowledge of the agreement, and therefore
did not ratify it before their father subsequently disposed of the
property, their rights in the property, as third-party beneficiaries,
were extinguished.
In Curato v. Brain,' the issue before the Rhode Island
Supreme Court was whether the plaintiff, Cathie L. Wilson, 2 acquired a one-fourth interest in a parcel of property as a result of a
property settlement agreement entered into by her parents upon
their divorce. 3 The plaintiffs attempted to establish a constructive
trust on the property. The court held that the property settlement
agreement constituted a third-party beneficiary contract, not a
trust, and that, to enforce the contract, Cathie had to assent to or
ratify the contract. 4 Because Cathie did not learn about the agreement until eleven years after her father disposed of the property,
she did not, and could not, ratify the contract. 5 Therefore, any
rights she had in the property had been extinguished. 6
FACTS AND TRAVEL

In 1965, John I. Brain (John) married his first wife, Barbara
Brain (Barbara).7 The couple had two children, Bethanie, born in
1967, and Cathie, born in 1968.8 In 1971, the couple received a
parcel of land on Beach Avenue on Block Island from John's par1.
2.
court.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

715 A.2d 631 (R.I. 1998).
Cathie and her sister, Bethanie J. Curate, instituted suit in the superior
Only Cathie appealed the judgment. See id. at 632.
Id. at 632.
See id. at 634-35.
See id. at 635.
See id.
See id. at 632.
See id.
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ents, upon which they built a house. 9 Shortly thereafter, the
couple separated.' 0
On February 12, 1974, the John and Barbara entered into an
informal property settlement agreement that addressed various issues, including custody of the children, support payments, and division of the property." A finalized version of the agreement was
executed on February 23, 1974.12 In the agreement, Barbara
agreed to transfer her right, title and interest in the property to
John by quit claim deed, with the understanding that, should the
property be transferred or sold, the minor children would receive a
one-fourth interest in the property. 13 Accordingly, Barbara executed a quitclaim deed, conveying all of her interest in the property
to John. 14 Their divorce was finalized on March 5, 1974.15
On April 11, 1976, John remarried. 16 He and his new wife,
Margaret, lived continuously on the Beach Avenue property.' 7 In
1980, John conveyed the property by warranty deed to himself and
Margaret as tenants by the entirety with rights of survivorship.' 8
Margaret contributed to the maintenance and upkeep of the property, paying taxes, the mortgage and repair costs.19
John passed away in October 1991.20 After John's death, Barbara told Bethanie 2 1 about the property settlement agreement; she
also told her that each daughter was to receive a one-fourth interest in the property upon its transfer. 2 2 Prior to this conversation,
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id. The quitclaim deed does not refer to the property settlement agreement, nor was the agreement (or any other document reflective of its terms) ever
recorded in the land evidence records of New Shoreham. See id.
15. See id. The property settlement agreement was incorporated into, but not
merged with, the divorce decree. See id.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See id. at 632-33.
19. See id. at 633.
20. See id.
21. Bethanie, in turn, told Cathie about the agreement. See id.
22. See id.
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neither daughter had any knowledge of their purported interest in
23
the property.
In March of 1992, Cathie and Bethanie filed this action in superior court seeking a declaratory judgment that they each possess
a one-fourth interest in the property and an injunction preventing
Margaret from interfering with their use and enjoyment of the
property.2 4 They argued 1) that a trust in their favor was created
by the terms of the property settlement agreement, and 2) that
John violated a fiduciary duty to his daughters by transferring the
property to Margaret, thereby justifying the imposition of a constructive trust on the property. 25 Margaret denied prior knowledge of the February 23, 1974 agreement, and maintained that the
sisters had no enforceable rights in the property. 2 6 She filed a
counterclaim seeking to recover the money she expended on the
maintenance and improvement of the property should the sisters
27
prevail in the action.
Prior to trial, the sisters filed a motion to compel the deposition testimony of Robert H. Breslin, Jr. (Breslin), John and Margaret's attorney, who had drafted John and Margaret's will in
1987.28 The sisters sought to question Breslin about any communications he may have had with John or Margaret concerning the
1980 warranty deed, in an attempt to demonstrate fraudulent conduct on their part.2 9 Margaret invoked the attorney-client privilege, 30 and Breslin refused to answer any questions concerning any
communications he may have had with his clients. 3 ' A Superior
Court Justice denied the motion, rejecting the sister's argument
32
that the attorney-client privilege did not apply.
23. See id. Barbara never told anyone about the agreement because she
thought that John "would do the right thing." Id.
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. She invoked the privilege on her own behalf and on behalf of John's estate.
See id.
31. See id.
32. See id. The sisters argued that the attorney-client privilege did not apply
because John's transfer of the property to Margaret violated the terms of the settlement agreement, which constituted a fraudulent act. See id.
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Following a bench trial, a justice of the superior court rejected
all of the claims submitted by the plaintiffs. The justice found 1)
that the property agreement was "at most" a third-party beneficiary contract to be performed by John at a future date, 2) that, "at
most," the sisters possessed an unvested and unenforceable contract right to one-fourth of the property, 3) that there was no evidence to indicate that John and Barbara created, or intended to
create, a trust, and, 4) that the imposition of a constructive trust
would be inappropriate because there was no evidence to establish
that Margaret had ever defrauded the sisters.3 3 Cathie appealed
this decision to the Rhode Island Supreme Court.
ANALysis AND HOLDING

On appeal, Cathie maintained that the trial justice erred in
four respects-i) in rejecting her request for the imposition of a
constructive trust, 2) in denying her motion to compel the testimony of Breslin, 3) in characterizing the agreement as a thirdparty beneficiary contract, and 4) in finding that John had an
34
unencumbered ownership interest in the real estate.
Cathie's appeal is comprised of three basic assertions. First,
she argues that the agreement reflects a promise made between
two parties who stood in a fiduciary relationship to each other, and
that the breach of that promise constituted a breach of a fiduciary
35
relationship necessitating the imposition of a constructive trust.

The court rejected this argument.
A constructive trust is "a relationship imposed by operation of
law as a remedy to redress a wrong or prevent an unjust enrichment."36 To justify the imposition of a constructive trust, the
plaintiff must establish by clear and convincing evidence the existence of fraud or breach of a fiduciary duty.3 7 With real property,
33. See id.
34. See id. at 634. Before addressing Cathie's allegations, the court set forth
the proper standard of review-the court will not disturb the findings of the trial
justice "unless such findings are clearly erroneous or unless the trial justice misconceived or overlooked material evidence or unless the decision fails to do substantial justice between the parties." Id.
35. See id.
36. Id. (quoting Simpson v. Dailey, 496 A.2d 126, 128 (R.I. 1985)).
37. See id.
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"there must be some element of fraudulent conduct by the person
in the possession of the property in procuring the conveyance."38
In the instant case, the court held that there was no evidence
that would necessitate the imposition of a constructive trust.
First, there was no evidence that would indicate that John or Barbara intended to create a trust-there was no clear declaration of a
39
trust, and the property agreement itself does not evince a trust.

The settlement agreement, the court held, merely established that
Barbara quitclaimed her interest in the property in return for
John's promise to provide for the children should he sell or transfer
the property. 40 Furthermore, the court held that there was no evidence to establish any fraud on the part of Margaret in obtaining
title to the property-there was no evidence to establish a fiduciary
relationship between Margaret and the sisters, and there was no
evidence to show that Margaret had any knowledge of the 1974
agreement between John and Barbara. 4 1 The court therefore concluded that John had full ownership rights in the property as a
result of the quitclaim deed executed by Barbara, and that the im42
position of a trust would be inappropriate.
Cathie also argues that "the characterization of a property settlement agreement that provides support for a divorcing couple's
children as a third party beneficiary contract is 'inconsistent with
public policy.'" 4 3 The court quickly dismissed this argument.
The court held that, to sue on a contract made for his or her
benefit, an intended beneficiary must assent to or ratify the contract.4 The court determined that although Cathie had rights
pursuant to the property settlement agreement that may have
been actionable at one time, these rights remained unvested and
therefore unenforceable until Cathie either assented or in some
way ratified the contract, which she did not do until 1991, when
she learned about the agreement for the first time. 45 By then, it
was too late-the agreement was breached, if at all, in 1980, when
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 635.
See id.
See id.
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John conveyed the property. 46 Barbara should have taken action,
47
or told her daughters about the agreement, in 1980.

Cathie's final argument "concerns the denial of the sister's motion to compel the deposition testimony of Breslin."48 Cathie asserts that Margaret's denial of any knowledge of the agreement
"strains credulity," and that she should have been allowed to question Breslin to prove Margaret's involvement. 4 9 Cathie further argues that the attorney-client privilege asserted by Margaret does
not apply because if Margaret took the property with knowledge of
the property settlement agreement, the transfer constituted a
fraud.5 0 The court disagreed and held that the attorney-client
privilege applied.
Generally, "communications made by a client to his attorney
for the purpose of seeking professional advice . . . are privileged
communications not subject to disclosure." 5 1 The attorney-client
privilege will generally survive the death of the client except in
limited circumstances where the communications are needed to in52
terpret a will.

Here, the attorney-client privilege attached for two reasons.
First, Cathie was not challenging the validity of a will, but rather,
she was challenging the conveyance of property. 53 Second, the
crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege did not apply
because that exception only pertains to ongoing crimes-anything
referring to the 1974 property settlement agreement, if it hap54
pened at all, concerned past conduct and is therefore protected.
Accordingly, the court held that the communications are privileged
and not subject to disclosure. 5 5
CONCLUSION

A property settlement agreement under which a couple's minor daughters were each to receive a one-fourth interest in a parcel
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

See id.
See id. A ten-year statute of limitation applies in this case. See id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 636 (citing Callahan v. Nystedt, 641 A.2d 58, 61 (R.I. 1998)).
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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of property, entered into by a father and mother upon their divorce, created a third-party beneficiary contract, not a trust. The
daughters, the beneficiaries of the contract, had to assent to or ratify the contract in order to enforce their rights in the contract. Because the daughters had no knowledge of the agreement, and
therefore did not ratify it before their father subsequently disposed
of the property, their rights in the property, as third-party beneficiaries, were extinguished.
Christine M. Fraser
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Property Law. Mellor v. O'Connor, 712 A.2d 375 (R.I. 1998). A
surviving joint tenant who has become sole owner of property is
not entitled to contribution from a deceased joint tenant's estate
toward payment of a jointly executed promissory note secured by a
mortgage on such property.
In Mellor v. O'Connor,1 the Rhode Island Supreme Court considered, for the first time, whether a surviving joint tenant who
has become the sole owner of property is entitled to contribution
from a deceased joint tenant's estate for payment of a jointly executed promissory note secured by a mortgage on the property. The
court ruled that the surviving joint tenant is not entitled to contribution. 2 The court said that under joint tenancy, all of the decedent's interest in the property has passed to the survivor, who
retains total ownership, and because the decedent has no remaining interest, it would be inequitable to compel contribution from
3
the decedent's estate.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

The plaintiff, Colleen Mellor (Colleen), and the decedent, Robert O'Connor (Robert), were engaged to be married. 4 On June 13,
1991, they jointly purchased a house in Warwick, Rhode Island for
$229,000.l The plaintiff contributed $11,450 and the decedent contributed approximately $85,000 as an initial deposit towards the
purchase price. 6 They obtained a mortgage from Plymouth Mortgage Company for the remaining balance of the purchase price and
jointly executed a promissory note for $140,000. 7 About one
month later, prior to the date when the first payment on the promissory note was due, Robert died. 8 His estate was probated, and
the decedent's two daughters were named executrices of his
estate. 9
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

712 A.2d 375 (R.I. 1998).
See id. at 379.
See id. at 380.
See id. at 375.
See id.

6.
7.
8.
9.

See
See
See
See

id.
id. at 375-76.
id. at 376.
id.
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On October 28, 1991, Colleen filed a claim against the estate
for $70,332.26, which was half of the balance that was due under
the note. 10 The decedent's estate denied the claim." Subsequently, on March 20, 1992, Colleen filed this action in Kent
County Superior Court.' 2 The first count of the complaint alleged
that the estate had breached its obligation under the note by failing to pay any money due under the note.' 3 The second count alleged that the estate was liable for one-half of the total amount
owed under the note, plus one-half of all expenses incurred, or to
be incurred, to maintain the residence under the doctrine of equitable contribution. 14 The defendants filed a four-count
counterclaim.15
A jury trial was commenced on April 29, 1996, and on May 1,
1996 the trial justice granted the defendants' motion for judgment
as a matter of law with respect to the plaintiff's complaint.' 6 The
trial justice determined that the first count of the complaint, alleging breach of an obligation under the note, was a cause of action for
the note holder, and that the plaintiff was not entitled to contribution from the decedent's estate as alleged in count two. 17 The
plaintiff appealed this judgment to the Rhode Island Supreme
8
Court.'
BACKGROUND

In 1955, the Rhode Island Supreme Court addressed the question of whether a plaintiff was entitled to have the executor of her
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id. at n.1 (citing R.I. Gen. Laws § 33-11-48 (1956) (1992 Reenactment)). Section 33-11-48 provided that:
[sluit on claims disallowed prior to the expiration of six (6) months from
first publication may be brought no later than thirty (30) days after the
unless the estate
expiration of six (6) months from first publication ....
has been represented as insolvent or request that the claim before commissioners has been duly filed.
R.I. Gen. Laws § 33-11-48 (1956) (1992 Reenactment).
13. See id. at 376.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id. at 377. The motion for a judgment as a matter of law was filed
pursuant to Rule 50(a) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. See id. at
377 n.2.
17. See id. at 377.
18. See id.
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deceased husband's will directed to pay from the estate a certain
joint and several promissory note, which is secured by a mortgage
on real estate whose title is now in dispute.19 The court held that
the plaintiff was not entitled to demand, from the executor, exonerating her husband's estate on an existing mortgage indebtedness,
but left the question of entitlement of contribution from a deceased
20
joint tenant's estate unanswered.
ANALYsis AND HOLDING

There are two conflicting views concerning this issue. The
first is the majority rule, which permits contribution to a surviving
joint tenant.2 1 The second is the minority rule, which holds that a
survivor is not entitled to contributions. 2 2 The Rhode Island
Supreme Court recognized that this is an issue of first
23
impression.
The trial justice relied on the case Florio v. Greenspan2 4 for
support. 2 5 In Florio,the plaintiff and her husband had jointly executed a promissory note and mortgage on a piece of property. 26 After the death of her husband, the plaintiff brought a bill of equity
for declaratory relief against the administrator of the husband's
estate, seeking a ruling that the unpaid balance of the note was an
obligation of the estate which the administrator must fulfill. 27 The
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ruled that the plaintiff
was not entitled to either exoneration or contribution because "despite the fact that both spouses were originally equally liable for
the mortgage debt, it is inequitable to require the estate of the deceased spouse to contribute to the discharge of an encumbrance on
property, where the entire ownership of which is in the surviving
28
spouse."
The Rhode Island Supreme Court followed this reasoning and
concluded that a surviving joint tenant who has become sole owner
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

See id. at 377-78 (citing Gardner v. Waldman, 111 A.2d 922 (R.I. 1955)).
See id. (citing Gardner, 111 A.2d at 923-24).
See id. at 378.
See id.
See id.
165 N.E.2d 753 (Mass. 1960).
See Mellor, 712 A.2d at 379.
See id. (citing Florio, 165 N.E.2d at 754).
See id.
Id. (quoting Florio, 165 N.E.2d at 754).
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of property is not entitled to contribution from a deceased joint tenant's estate toward payment of a jointly executed promissory note
secured by a mortgage on such property. 29 To hold otherwise, according to the court, would cause unjust enrichment on the part of
the plaintiff, who already holds all the rights incident to ownership
of the property. 30 The court also noted that although the cases
from jurisdictions adopting the minority rule have involved parties
who were married and held property as tenants by the entirety,
this distinction does not alter the analysis. 3 1
CONCLUSION

Since this is a case of first impression in Rhode Island, it has
substantial significance to state property laws. The court sets out
the rule that a surviving joint tenant who has become sole owner of
property is not entitled to contribution from a deceased joint tenant's estate toward payment of a jointly executed promissory note
secured by a mortgage on such property. In adopting this minority
rule, the court has determined that it would be inequitable to require the estate of a deceased spouse to contribute toward payment
of a mortgage where the entire ownership of the property lies in
the surviving spouse.
Ryan M. Borges

29. See id.
30. See id. at 380-81.
31. See id.
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Property Law. Robinson v. Delfino, 710 A.2d 154 (R.I. 1998).
Under Rhode Island law, the surviving named holder of a joint
bank account is entitled to receive the remaining funds in that account absent fraud, undue influence, duress, or lack of mental
capacity.
In Robinson v. Delfino,' the Rhode Island Supreme Court
sought to set out a rigid rule concerning survivorship rights in
jointly held bank accounts. 2 Accordingly, the court determined
that the named surviving holder of the joint account shall receive
the funds contained therein absent a showing of fraud, undue influence, duress, or lack of mental capacity. 3
FACTS AND TRAVEL

Florence A. Izzi (decedent) died intestate on December 27,
1993, leaving two siblings: John Izzi (Izzi) and Elisa Delfino
(Delfino). 4 Decedent maintained several joint bank accounts with
both Delfino and her husband, Donald Rich (Rich).5 Each of these
accounts were funded entirely with decedent's money. 6 Neither
Delfino nor Rich ever had possession of any of the passbooks, statements, or certificates of deposit for any of the accounts. 7 After decedent's death, both Delfino and Rich withdrew all the money
contained in the respective joint accounts maintained by the deceased.8 Decedent's brother, Izzi, sought to have those joint accounts treated as if they were established solely for convenience,
therefore adding the proceeds into decedent's estate.9
The defendants, Delfino and Rich, appealed this case to the
Rhode Island Supreme Court from an order of trial justice di1. 710 A.2d 154 (R.I. 1998).
2. Id. at 156.
3. See id. at 160-61.
4. See id. at 155.
5. See id. at 155-56. On February 5, 1993, decedent opened three joint bank
accounts in her and Rich's names. See id. at 155. Decedent also maintained seven
joint bank accounts with Delfino. See id. Additionally, decedent also maintained
two safe-deposit boxes, one as a joint tenant with Delfino, the other as a joint tenant with Rich. See id.
6. See id. at 155.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
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recting them to return money which had previously been contained
in joint bank accounts with decedent. 10
BACKGROUND

The trial justice's decision was based, in great part, upon the
Rhode Island Supreme Court's holding in Nocera v. Lembo." In
Nocera, the court stated that a joint bank account's form "constitutes prima facie evidence of ownership in the survivor upon the
death of the other joint owner." 12 However, the court noted in
Nocera that this presumption is not controlling. 13 Evidence may
be introduced to show that the original owner of the joint account
added the survivor's name for convenience sake, not intending to
14
make a gift of the account to the named survivor.
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

In Robinson v. Delfino, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
sought to clarify, once and for all, Rhode Island's law on survivorship rights in joint bank accounts. 15 Noting that the current law
was not only "both unpredictable and inconsistent," but also "frustrat[ed] the public's common understanding of what it always believed that a joint bank account was intended to accomplish," the
6
court established a rigid rule concerning joint bank accounts.'
This new law concerning survivorship rights in joint bank accounts was set forth by the court to make the law predictable and
7
reliable to those people who establish joint bank accounts.'
Therefore, the court concluded that:
the opening of a joint bank account wherein survivorship
rights are specifically provided for is conclusive evidence of
the intention to transfer to the survivor an immediate in
praesenti joint beneficial possessory ownership right in the
10.

See id. at 154-55.

11. See id. at 156 (citing Nocera v. Lembo, 397 A.2d 524 (1979)).
12. Nocera, 397 A.2d at 525.
13. See id. at 526.
14. See id.
15. Robinson, 710 A.2d at 156-57. The court "facetiously noted" that, in Rhode
Island, there are two ways to start a civil suit: first, is to file a complaint pursuant
to Superior Court Rule of Civil Procedure 3, and second, to open a joint bank ac-

count with the right of survivorship. Id. at 156-57 n.8.
16. Id. at 156.
17. See id. at 160.
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balance of the account remaining after the death of the depositor, absent evidence of fraud, undue influence, duress, or
lack of mental capacity.' 8
This reasoning, according to the court, is based upon the current
trend among courts to treat joint bank accounts in the way in
which the majority of the public actually perceive joint bank
accounts.19
The court determined that "the absolute common understanding of the vast majority of people establishing joint bank accounts
nowadays is that they create immediate possessory as well as survivorship rights."20 Therefore, to permit the introduction of extrinsic evidence to analyze the depositor's intent is, according to the
court, denying individuals their rights under such joint bank
21
accounts.
In formulating its opinion, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
relied heavily on Wright v. Bloom, 2 2 an Ohio court case. 23 In
Wright, the Ohio Supreme Court reasoned that survivorship rights
in a joint bank account should not be defeated through use of extrinsic evidence of the depositor's intent.24 Because the "need for
uniformity" in this area of law is essential, the Ohio Supreme
Court noted that permitting extrinsic evidence of the depositor's
intent served only to perpetuate confusion and encourage "the very
evils of misinformation and litigation sought to be avoided." 25 The
Rhode Island Supreme Court based its opinion on similar grounds,
namely, that:
[a] surviving named joint account holder should be entitled to
obtain funds remaining on deposit in a joint account without
the necessity of first having to travel through several court
systems and to have lawyers, trial judges, juries, and appel18. Id. at 160-61.
19. See id. at 158.
20. Id. at 160.
21. See id.
22. 635 N.E.2d 31 (Ohio 1994).
23. See Robinson, 710 A.2d at 158-60.
24. Wright, 635 N.E.2d at 38. The Rhode Island Supreme Court expressly
adopts the Ohio court's conclusion that "the depositor's intent to transfer a present
interest in a joint and survivorship account to be irrelevant in a controversy involving the rights of a surviving party to the sums remaining in such account at the
death of the depositor." Robinson, 710 A.2d at 159 (quoting Wright, 635 N.E.2d at
36).
25. Robinson, 710 A.2d at 159 (quoting Wright, 635 N.E.2d at 37).
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late judges perform post mortem cerebral autopsies and examinations in order to determine and second-guess what the
subjective intent of the deceased joint owner of the account
26
was at the time the account was created.
Thus, in order to implement this reasoning, the court was forced to
issue a rigid decision, basically stating that a surviving holder
takes absent fraud, duress, undue influence, or lack of mental
27
capacity.
CONCLUSION

In Robinson v. Delfino, the Rhode Island Supreme Court clarified the law concerning survivorship rights in joint bank accounts,
at least for the time being. 28 By eliminating the convenience account exception to joint bank accounts, the court's holding mandates that the named surviving holder receive any remaining
funds in the joint account absent a showing of fraud, undue influence, duress, or lack of mental capacity.
Christopher E. Friel

26. Id. at 160.
27. See id. at 161.
28. See Bielecki v. Boissel, 715 A.2d 571 (R.I. 1998).

